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I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the political negotiations between the Armed
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian
government, several members of different leftist organizations created the
Uni6n Patri6ticaa (UP) political party on May 28, 1985. The party allowed
members of several social movements to join a political organization that
was an alternative to the closed politics created by the Frente Nacional.
This agreement set up a system whereby the liberal and conservative
parties shared the government for sixteen years, which impeded access by

* I have benefitted from the advice of Professors M.J. Peterson, John Brigham, and Agustfn
Lao Montes of the University of Massachusetts and from the comments and support of the members
of the "Work in Progress" group (Laura Donaldson, Alec Ewald, Laura Hatcher, and Aaron
Lorenz). However the sole responsibility for the final outcome is mine.
** University of Massachusetts, Amherst, fbenavid@legal.umass.edu.
1. Patriotic Union [hereinafter UP].
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other political forces. Union members, students, state workers, and others
joined the party and gave new color to the political panorama in Colombia.
In the elections of 1986 and 1988, the UP achieved official positions in the
Colombian Congress and government.'
The success of the UP triggered efforts to eliminate it by threatening,
disappearing, and killing its members. Two presidential candidates for the
elections of 1990 (Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa) were
killed.4 As REINICIAR and Comisi6n Colombianade Juristas,petitioners
in Diaz et al. v. Colombia under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (ICHR), pointed out, "the persecution of
the membership of the Patriotic Union constitutes an attempt to eliminate
the party as a political force through violence and intimidation carried out
against its members and leaders."5 The result of this persecution amounted
to the extrajudicial execution of 1163 of its members, the forced
disappearance of another 123, unsuccessful assassination attempts against
43, and threats against 225 between 1985 and 1993.6
Human rights NGOs, REINICIAR, and Comisi6n Colombiana de
Juristas requested the ICHR condemn the Colombian state for the
commission of the crime of political genocide against the membership of
the UP. The ICHR accepted the case but decided to proceed under the
charge of Crimes Against Humanity,7 a redefinition of the offense in
2. See generally FRANK SAFFORD & MARCO PALACIOS, COLOMBIA: FRAGMENTED LAND
DIVIDED SOCIETY (2002) (presents in English a good general history of Colombia).
3. According to Javier Giraldo, in the period 1985-1996 "a UP party member or supporter
has been murdered every 53 hours. In the party's first four years of existence, this persecution was
even more intense with a murder every 39 hours, and, in the run-up to elections, even more chilling,
one every 26 hours." JAVIER GIRALDO S.J., COLOMBIA: THE GENOCIDAL DEMOCRACY 68 (1996).
4. Jaime Pardo Leal, a former Judge in BogotA and leader of the Union of the Judiciary, was
the first UP's presidential candidate. He was killed in 1989. After the assassination of Pardo Leal,
Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, union leader in UrabA, became the second presidential candidate of the
UP for the same election. He was killed the same year, after a press conference in which the
Minister of Interior, Carlos Lemos said that the UP was FARC's political arm. Two more
presidential candidates for the elections of 1990, Carlos Pizarro Leong6mez, from the leftist M- 19,
and Luis Carlos Galin, a former dissident from the liberal party, were killed.
5. Dfaz et al. v. Colombia, Case 11.227, Inter.-Am. C.H.R. 5/97, OEA/ser.L.V./II.95 doe.
7 rev. 99 (1997), l 4, availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1996/colombia5-97.htm
(last visited June 18, 2003).
6. Id. 126.
7. Human rights investigations in the Inter-American system has the following procedure:
A person presents a complaint before the ICHR, this organization investigates the case, hears the
government's arguments and tries to reach an agreement between the parties. If it is not possible
to reach an agreement, the ICHR takes the case before the Inter-American Human Rights Court,
where the process takes all the features of an adversarial system, and the Inter-American Human
Rights Court renders a ruling binding on the parties. See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
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accordance with international law. In effect, the ICHR was willing to state
that serious violations of human rights had occurred, but not to accept the
argument from the Colombian complainant that those violations amounted
to genocide. In so doing, it acknowledged that the terms of the U.N.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention) do not cover political groups.
The core of the argument from the complainants was that the Genocide
Convention protected the UP as a political group. According to them,
under the Genocide Convention, the Colombian state could be held
responsible either for direct participation in the elimination of the party or
for indirect responsibility by its failure to make any effort to stop it;
therefore, the Colombian state was responsible for the political genocide
committed against the UP.
The question that arises is: why would a human rights NGO decide to
argue that elimination of political groups is a crime of political genocide?
This Article will show that until 1990 the confusion of the international
doctrine regarding crimes against humanity made the answer unclear. By
analyzing this story, I will show that the claims of the NGOs were
constituted by the international law, that is, the law determined the way
NGOs saw the world and, therefore, determined how they interpreted the
UP situation. 8
Whether the Genocide Convention covers the elimination of groups
because of their political beliefs has been a hotly contested question. Some
scholars believed that the history of the U.N. General Assembly 1946
Resolution 96(I) permits the definition of political genocide as a crime
under international law9 and that the exclusion of political groups in the
drafting of the Genocide Convention was an error on the part of the U.N.
General Assembly in 1948 that needs to be fixed.'0 Others, basing their

Commission on Human Rights, availableat www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basiclb.htm (last visited
June 12, 2003).
8. The basis for this argument is constitutive theory. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A
THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977); JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERESTS (1996); ALAN
HUNT, EXPLORATIONS INLAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993).
9. See, e.g., Myriam Avila Rolddn, Delitos de Lesa Humanidad, in FORO REFORMA

INTEGRAL AL SISTEMA PENAL (1999); Mario Madrid-Malo GarizMbal, La penalizaci6n de las
violaciones de los derechos humanos y de las violaciones del derecho internacionalhumanitario
en Colombia, in SENTIDO Y CONTENIDOS DEL SISTEMA PENAL EN LA GLOBALIZACI6N (2000); see
also LAWRENCE LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 84-88 (199 1).
10. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINALLAW 203-04 (2d ed. 1999); KURTJONASSOHN &KARIN BJORSON, GENOCIDEANDGROSS
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (1998); LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS
POLITICAL USE INTHE 20rH CENTURY 24-30 (198 1); Barbara Harff, Recognizing Genocide and
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arguments in the history of the drafting of the Genocide Convention,
showed that political groups were explicitly excluded from the 1948
Convention and, therefore, must be protected under other provisions of
international law."
This debate is rooted in the history of crimes against humanity and
particularly in the content of what is called in this Article "the Nuremberg
doctrine." The use of the concept of crimes against humanity by the
Colombian NGOs led them to ask for punishment for the perpetrators of
the extermination of the UP membership through the use of the political
genocide argument. In the Argentinean Military Junta and the Chilean
DictatorAugusto Pinochet Ugartecases, 2 attack against political groups
were treated as genocide against a national or a religious group.
The concept of political genocide is based in the use of an ontological
conception of genocide. Supporters of the label "political genocide" think
that there is a conception of genocide independent from the definition of
international law. This ontological approach maintains that in some way
the delegates drafting the Genocide Convention took its definition from a
platonic world of ideas and improperly narrowed the idealistic meaning of
the crime. This conception also makes an ontological distinction between
the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity more generally, of
which genocide is the gravest. This hierarchy assumes that the illegal
transfer of children from a national group to another - a case of genocide
is more evil than the extermination of a group on political grounds,
because the first is a genocide and the latter just a crime against humanity.
This conception takes the viewpoint that crimes have an independent
ontological existence
and are not definitions of certain acts as crimes under
3
international law.'
There are moral and pragmatic reasons behind this argument. The
former can be understood as saying that the elimination of a group with a
certain common identity should be punished under international law but
following the definition given in the ideal world. The latter is
Politicide, in GENOCIDE WATCH 27-41 (Helen Fein ed., 1992); ANTONIOCASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS
INA CHANGING WORLD 75-78 (1990).
11. WIUIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE ININTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 144-45

(2000); Walter Lippman, Genocide, in I INTERNATIONALCRIMINALLAW 597 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1999).
12. See infra Part VI (detailing these two cases).
13. See generally ALESSANDRO BARATTA, CRIMINOLOGIA CRITICA Y CRITICA DEL DERECHO
PENAL: INTRODUCCION A LA SOCIOLOGIA JURIDICO PENAL (1986) (regarding the ontological
conception of crimes); PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITy: A TREATISE INTHE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1967); COLIN SUMNER, SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE: AN OBITUARY (1994); ROBERTO BERGALU, ELPENSAMIENTO CRIMINOL5GICO (1983).
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complementary, because it says that the only way to secure punishment for
the perpetrators of those acts is by labeling them as genocide, whether
cultural, social, or political.
In this Article I will show, first, that there are no grounds to hold that
the elimination of political groups can be treated as political genocide
under international law, and second, that under the doctrine developed in
ICTY Prosecutorv. Dusko Tadic there is no need to appeal to that category
to obtain the punishment of the perpetrators of crimes against political
groups. Nevertheless, I will show that the conceptual structure of crimes
against humanity - especially the requirement of being part of a massive
or widespread attack - seems to make plausible the question of creating
a crime of political genocide. By the end of this Article I hope it will be
clear that while theoretically this seems to be an important claim, in
actuality current international law provides all the necessary means to
punish those responsible for this kind of human rights violation.
II. THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE: FROM THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946
RESOLUTION 96() TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION OF 1948

The first work on the topic of genocide was a book by Raphael Lemkin,
Axis Rule in OccupiedEurope.14 In his book, Lemkin analyzed the crimes
committed against national, ethnic, and religious groups and coined the
word genocide, through the combination of the Greek word genos and the
Latin cide, to refer to the attacks against such groups. Lemkin had been
concerned about intergroup hatred for many years. In the Fifth Conference
for the Unification of Penal Law, in Madrid in 1933, he proposed an
international treaty "declaring that attacks upon national, religious, and
ethnic groups should be made international crimes."' 5 Lemkin also
proposed the creation of the crimes of vandalism and barbarity. He defined
those crimes in the following terms:
Whosoever, out of hatred towards a racial, religious or social
collectivity, or with a view to the extermination thereof, undertakes
a punishable action against the life, bodily integrity, liberty, dignity
or economic existence of a person belonging to such collectivity, is
liable for the crime of barbarity, to a penalty of.... unless his deed
falls within a more severe provision of the given code.

14.

RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AxiS IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF

GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS

(1944).

15. Id. at xiii.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

5

Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Vol. 15, Iss.
LAW4 [2003], Art. 4
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OFLaw,

[Vol. 15

Whosoever, either out of hatred towards a racial, religious or
social collectivity, or with a view to the extermination thereof,
destroys its cultural or artistic works, will be liable for the crime of
vandalism unless his deed falls within a more severe provision of
the given code. 16
The key feature of those crimes was the fact that they were committed
out of hatred against the attacked group. In the first attempt to define a
crime protecting the groups, Lemkin highlighted the reasons the agent
gave for committing the crime. However, in Axis Rule Lemkin went
further and highlighted the element of intent; that is to say, in that book the
important feature was not the reasons that drove the agent to commit the
crime -

hatred, economics, and so forth - but the intention to eliminate

the group as such.' 7 To Lemkin, genocide does not require the elimination
of the group as a whole but the agent does have to have the intention of
eliminating it partially or completely: "Genocide is directed against the
national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against
individuals,
not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national
8
group."
Lemkin realized that some groups were protected under international
law, but he emphasized the need for the creation of the crime in order to
protect those who were not.' 9 It is interesting to point out that Lemkin did
not mention political groups as one of the groups requiring that protection:
De lege ferenda, the definition of genocide in the Hague
Regulations thus amended should consist of two essential parts: in
the first should be included every action infringing upon the life,
honor, liberty, health, corporal integrity, economic existence, and
the honor of the inhabitants when committed because they belong
to a national, religious or racial group; and in the second, every
policy aiming at the destruction or the aggrandizement of one of
such groups to the prejudice or detriment of another.20
16. Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under InternationalLaw, 41 AM. J.INT'LL. 146
n.3 (1947). Another definition can be found in an earlier work by Lemkin. LEMKIN, supra note 14,
at 91.
17. See ALICIA GIL GIL, ELGENOCDIO Y OTROS CRIMENES INTERNACIONALES (1999) (on this

difference and its relevance in the civil law tradition).
18. LEMKIN, supra note 14, at 79. Initially Lemkin mentioned only national groups, but he
later included all the groups contained in the Genocide Convention. When he wrote his book he had
in mind the Germanization of Poland and other European nations. Id. at 79-82.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 93.
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It was in the drafting of the 1946 Resolution 96(1) that the question of
including political groups arose as part of the concept of genocide. The
governments of Cuba, India, and Panama, with legal assistance from
Lemkin, requested on November 2nd, 1946, that the Secretary General of
the United Nations include in the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly an
item on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. The
request was accompanied with a draft of a resolution, prepared by Lemkin,
condemning the crime of genocide.
The U.N. General Assembly discussed the question on November 9th
and 12th, 1946 and then sent it to the Sixth Committee, which created a
subcommittee to discuss the issue. After a heated debate in the
subcommittee, political groups were included in the draft of the
Resolution. The issue then went back to the Sixth Committee, which
approved the decision of the subcommittee and reported the result to the
U.N. General Assembly with a draft of the Resolution. The Resolution was
adopted unanimously and without debate on December 11th 1946.21
The preamble of the 1946 Resolution 96(I) states:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual
human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the
conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these
groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of
the United Nations.
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when
racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed,
entirely or in part.22
Then the Resolution affirms that "Genocide is a crime under international
law which civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which
principals and accomplices - whether private individuals, public officials
or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial,
political or any other grounds - are punishable.23

21. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 17 (1960).
22. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. GAOR, Ist Sess., at 189, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946).
23. Id. The Language of the Resolution requested by Cuba, India, and Panama differs from
that suggested by Lemkin. While Lemlin mentioned national, racial, and religious groups whose
"biological, cultural or political existence was imperiled," Resolution 96(I) clearly states that
"genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and accomplices
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The reasons for the inclusion of political groups are unknown, but the
fact is that Lemkin disagreed with it. It was a decision taken in the
subcommittee created by the Sixth Committee without any explanation.
However, the inclusion of political groups in the text of the Resolution has
been the basis of the claim that political genocide must be considered a
crime under international law. According to Schabas, it has been
argued that the presence of political groups within the 1946
definition suggests the existence of a broader concept of genocide
than that expressed in the [Genocide] Convention, one that reflects
customary law. But given the very meagre record of the debates, the
haste with which the resolution was adopted, the novelty of the
term, and the fact that the subsequent Convention excludes
reference to political groups, such a conclusion seems
adventuresome at best.24
That is to say, the process of drafting Resolution 96(1) does not allow any
interpretation aimed at including political genocide within the scope of the
Genocide Convention or as a crime under international law. As Schabas
goes on to point out, "[t]he fact that the enumeration in Resolution 96(1)
also omits ethnic and national groups is a further argument against its
authority on the issue. 25
In Resolution 96(I), the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was
requested to "undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up
a draft convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next
regular session of the General Assembly. '26 The Secretary General
suggested that the ECOSOC assign the discussion to the Commission on
Human Rights, but due to the opposition of the United Kingdom and
because of the heavy schedule of the Commission, the issue returned to the
Secretariat, which "would prepare a draft convention for a subsequent
review by a commission of ECOSOC."27

whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed
on religious, racial, political or any other grounds - are punishable." Lippman, supra note 11, at
591,594.
24. SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 134 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 51.
27. Id.

-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/4

8

2003]
THE ELIMINATION OFThe
POLITICAL
GROUPS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL
WAND International
THE CONSTITUTION
583
Benavides-Vanegas:
Elimination
of Political
Groups LA
Under
Law and

t

Analyzing the issue in the ECOSOC, it adopted a resolution asking the
Secretary General to draw a draft of a convention,28 returning in this way
the issue to the Secretariat. 29 The Secretary General requested the Human
Rights Division of the Secretariat to draw up the draft. This draft was
discussed with Raphael Lemkin, Donnedieu de Vabres, and Vespasiano
Pella, the three experts appointed to analyze the matter. The draft included
political groups within the scope of the future convention but Lemkin
regarded political groups as lacking permanence and specific
characteristics the other groups had. This was his consistent position on the
topic. From his first article in 1933 to his article in the American Journal
ofInternationalLaw in 1946, he held that genocide conveys a specific loss
"to civilization in the form of the cultural contributions which can be made
only by groups of people united through national, racial or cultural
characteristics."3 On the other hand, de Vabres, the French expert and
former Judge in the Nuremberg Tribunal, responded that genocide was
such a heinous crime that excluding political groups could be regarded as
justifying their elimination. 3' Despite the disagreement of Lemkin, the
draft from the Secretariat became the first draft of the Genocide
Convention.
The draft included ethnic, racial, national, religious, and political
groups 32 and was presented to the ECOSOC at its fifth session, in JulyAugust 1947. 33 The draft was sent to the state members to receive their
comments, but only seven of them answered the request. On August 6th,
1947, the ECOSOC instructed the Secretary General to transmit the draft
with the comments to the U.N. General Assembly in order to discuss the
34
draft at the earliest possible time and reach an agreement on it.
The draft of the Genocide Convention was put in the agenda of the
U.N. General Assembly at its second session, in September-December
1947, and the U.N. General Assembly submitted the issue to the Sixth
Committee. The members of the Sixth Committee were in disagreement

28. See generally NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE ATiTruDE OFTHE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ToWARD THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1949); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION:
ITS ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION (1949).

29. According to LeBlanc, this difficult path is the result of second thoughts that some states

were having about the importance of a convention on genocide. LEBLANC, supra note 9, at 26.
30. Lemkin, supra note 16, at 147.
31. SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 134.

32. The draft stated in Article I.I:
"The purpose of this Convention is to prevent the
destruction of racial, national, linguistic, religious or political groups of human beings." ROBINSON,
supra note 21, at 123.
33. SCHABAS, supra note l1,at 55.
34. Id. at 135.
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about the topic because it included political groups within the scope of the
future convention.
The Sixth Committee created an Ad-Hoc Committee to solve the
differences. In this Ad-Hoc Committee, there was further disagreement as
to the inclusion of political groups. In the sessions of the Ad-Hoc
Committee, the representative from China questioned the inclusion of
political groups because it "had neither the stability nor the homogeneity
of an ethnical group,"35 and suggested that there could be confusion
between the idea of political genocide and political crime.36 The Soviet
representative shared the same opinion and rejected the inclusion of
political groups on the grounds that the word genocide "meant essentially
persecution of a racial, national or religious group."" The Soviet
representative argued that it was against the scientific definition to include
political groups. In Nuremberg, he said, "the term 'genocide' . . . was
defined as follows: extermination of racial and religious groups, . . .
Genocide was essentially bound up with fascist and Nazi ideologies, and
other similar racial theories spreading national and racial hatred, and
aiming at the domination of the so-called 'superior' races and the
extermination of the so-called 'inferior' races."38 According to the Soviet
representative, the term needed objective and not subjective
characteristics; "[o]n the basis of that fundamental concept, the groups
could easily be distinguished: they were the racial and national groups
which constituted distinct, clearly determinable communities. 39
The Iranian representative said that in racial and other groups
membership was permanent and inevitable, whereas in political groups
membership was voluntary. 40 Many representatives, like those from
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, were concerned about the

35. Id.
36. Id. According to such a view, the perpetrator of an attack of a political group could not
be extradited because that act could be considered a political crime. However, it is clear that acts
like those of genocide lack the privilege of being considered political crimes.
37. Id.
38. KUPER, supra note 10, at 25.
39. Id. This is the same argument used in Prosecutorv. Jean-PaulAkayesu to reject the
inclusion of other groups than those included in the Genocide Convention. In Prosecutor v.
GeorgesRutaganda,the ICTR wrote that only racial groups could be considered as stable groups.
In the ICTY Statute, women were protected under Article 40, because they "comprise a stable and
identifiable and stable group. This group would not be subject to the argument relating to changing
of membership or instability which led to the exclusion of 'political groups."' VIRGINIA MORRIS
& MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 88 (1995).
40. KUPER, supra note 10, at 26.
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possibility that the inclusion of political groups could affect antisubversive activities of the states. 4' The Venezuelan representative said in
the drafting of the Genocide Convention that "[s]ubversive elements might
make use of the convention to weaken attempts of their own Government
to suppress them. 4 2 The Soviet Union delegate supported the Venezuelan
argument and said that an attack on political
groups would belong to the
43
category of crimes against humanity.
Those who opposed the inclusion of political groups generally argued
that those groups "should be [protected] by national legislation, and that
the international level, the appropriate instruments were those being
prepared by the Human Rights Commission. 4 4 In support of the inclusion
of political groups, the U.S. ambassador said that political groups were
identifiable enough to be exterminated, therefore, they should be included
in the protected groups. The delegate of Haiti supported the inclusion of
political groups within the scope of the Genocide Convention and held that
"the Government which was responsible would always be able to allege
that the extermination of any group had been dictated by political
considerations, such as the necessity for quelling an insurrection or
maintaining public order."45
Despite the discussion, at the end there was agreement on the inclusion
of political groups. The draft rendered by the Ad-Hoc Committee offered
this definition of genocide in Article II: "any of the following deliberate
acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious or
political group, on grounds of the national
or racial origin, religious belief,
46
or political opinion of its members.
The issue returned for discussion in the Sixth Committee. In the first
reading of the draft the inclusion of political groups was approved and in
a second reading political groups were still within the scope of the
Genocide Convention. The Sixth Committee decided, by 29 votes to 13

41. In a letter to John Foster Dulles, the Chair of the Genocide Convention, James Rosenberg
mentioned the importance of having good relations with Latin American countries and how the
word "political" was of concern to these countries. He suggested to Dulles the deletion of the word
political to ease not only the process of signing the Genocide Convention but also its ratification.
Letter from James Rosenberg to John Foster Dulles (Nov. 3, 1948) (on file as part of the Raphael
Lemkin Papers, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division, New York City Public University (Lemkin
Papers, Box 1)).
42. SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 137.
43. KUPER, supra note 10, at 26.
44. Id. at 28-29.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 32.
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with 9 abstentions, to include political groups within the scope of the
Genocide Convention.47
However the debate was not over. A proposal made by Egypt,
Uruguay, and Iran called for the exclusion of political groups. The Soviet
Union, China,48 and Venezuela49 supported this proposal. According to
Kuper, that proposal was the result of the pressure made by some
governments, who were against the inclusion because they needed "to
50
retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress political opposition."
However, the fact that some of the states supporting the proposal were
strong democracies at the time, like Uruguay, makes the argument by
Kuper untenable.
The main obstacle for the elimination of political groups was U.S.
support for their inclusion, but after several negotiations the United States
decided to support the exclusion of those groups. The position was
expressed with the following words:
The United States delegation continued to think that its point of
view was correct but, in a conciliatory spirit and in order to avoid
the possibility that the application of the convention to political
groups might prevent certain countries from acceding to it, he
would support the proposal to delete from article II the provisions
relating to political groups.5
As the result of the negotiations, the Sixth Committee voted for the
exclusion of political groups by 22 to 6 and 12 abstentions. 2 Once the
differences were solved in the Sixth Committee, the Genocide Convention
was sent to the U.N. General Assembly, which approved the following text
for Article 11 of the Genocide Convention of 1948:

47. SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 138.

48. Although China supported the deletion of political groups at the beginning of the
discussion, once they were excluded from the Genocide Convention, the representative from China
expressed his concern for this exclusion because "at a time of ideological strife political groups
were in greater need of protection than national and religious groups." Id. at 139.
49. Lebanon, Sweden, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic,
Iran, Egypt, Belgium, Uruguay, and the Soviet Union were in favor of the exclusion of political
groups. Id. at 140.
50. KUPER, supra note 10, at 30.
51. SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 139.

52. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/4

12

20031 THE ELMINATION OFPOUTICAL GROUPS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAWAND THE CONSTITUTION

587

Benavides-Vanegas: The Elimination of Political Groups Under International Law and t

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 3
Besides excluding political groups, the U.N. General Assembly took up
the definition of genocide belonging to Lemkin that it is an act in which
the key feature was the intention to eliminate in whole or in part the group
as such. That means that the intent element replaced the idea or grounds
or motives of hatred present in the definition of the crime of barbarity
proposed by Lemkin in the Fifth Conference for the Unification of Penal
Law, held in Madrid in 1933. The reasons for the exclusion of political
groups are not clear. Some scholars, like Kuper 4 and Cassese," wrote that
it was the result of Soviet pressure and the power showed by the so-called
Soviet bloc. However, LeBlanc, in his excellent analysis of the history of
the exclusion of political groups, shows that this was not the case. He
divided the arguments for and against exclusion in the following way:
In favor: (1) scientific reasons call for the exclusion of political groups; (2)
it was an issue of the Human Rights Commission; (3) political groups lack
stability or permanence; and (4) the inclusion of political groups would
jeopardize ratification, since some countries were concerned about their
anti-subversive activities. Against: (1) many states define in its legislation
political groups; (2) many groups, not only political groups, could be
involved in subversive activities; and (3) the decision not to follow the
result of Resolution 96(1) could weaken the credibility of the United
Nations.56
LeBlanc shows that the Soviet bloc alone lacked the power to control
the pace and directions of the negotiations. The fact that many different
states, with completely different ideologies, agreed in the exclusion of
political groups has to be taken into account, because it challenges the idea

53. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
54. See generally KUPER, supra note 10.
55. CASSESE, supra note 10, at 75.
56. LEBLANC, supra note 9, at 61-64.
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of some invisible hand determining the outcome of the discussions.
Moreover, the inclusion of political groups was not a suggestion of the
Soviet bloc but one of the Secretary General in the first draft of the
Genocide Convention; therefore, it cannot be said that it was part of a
hidden Soviet strategy. In his analysis, LeBlanc shows that a majority of
the countries were in favor of eliminating political groups from the text of
the Genocide Convention. Supporters included 50% of African countries,
38.5% of Asian, 50% of Oceania, 10% of the Americas, and 23.5% of
European, whereas 0% of African countries, 23.1% of Asian, 0% of
Oceania, 9.1% of the Americas, and 5.9% of European were against that
deletion.57
Kuper, Cassese, and others made the same argument about the Soviet
bloc pressure to obtain the deletion of political groups. However, the socalled Soviet bloc was made only of six states. 58 The history of the votes
of every country shows that most of them divided their preferences,
sometimes supporting the position of the United States, others supporting
the position of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the idea that the exclusion was
the result of a totalitarian conspiracy loses its basis when we realize that
amongst the countries that supported the deletion of political groups were
Sweden and Uruguay, two strong democracies at the time. 59 The
opposition of institutions like the World Jewish Congress in the United
States itself calls for the rejection of this thesis.
In sum, there is no evidence that demonstrates that the exclusion of
political groups was not the result of the difficulties in treating political
groups as though they had the same stability and identity as national and
religious groups. But in the event that political groups had been excluded
because of the dark intention some countries had in order to avoid
punishment, the question remains: Is there any need to treat the
extermination of political groups as a crime of genocide? Under current
international law, there is no basis to hold such a claim. Even though those
in favor of the inclusion of political groups in the category of genocide use
the history of the Genocide Convention to support their claim, it is clear
that this does not help them and that it is useless to appeal to history to
demonstrate their thesis. This claim is based in an ontological conception
of the crime of genocide, and the desire to punish those crimes as a
stronger category than crimes against humanity.

57. Id. at 67.
58. LEBLANC, supra note 9, at 66.
59. The idea that totalitarian states support the exclusion of political groups is challenged
with the example of Haiti, in that time governed by dictator Jean Paul Duvalier, commonly known
as Papa Doc.
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In the following section, I will present the scholarship on the specific
topic of political genocide and its development in international law in
order to demonstrate that the claim to include political groups within the
scope of the Genocide Convention is based on the Nuremberg doctrine,
which means that after the Tadic doctrine those claims are unsupported.
I.THE DISCUSSION ABOUT POLITICAL GENOCIDE

The debate about the inclusion of political groups within the scope of
the Genocide Convention did not end with the Convention's approval.
From time to time in different international negotiations in which the
crime of genocide is subject to analysis, there are delegates who advocate
the inclusion of political groups within the scope of the definition of the
crime of genocide. Such was the case in the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where some
delegations suggested expanding the scope of the Genocide Convention
"to encompass social and political groups. ' 6° Others delegations rejected
this proposal on the grounds that it could create confusion between crimes
against humanity and genocide. A similar discussion took place in the
debates over the Statute of the International Criminal Court in Rome
(Rome Statute) in 1998, where the delegation of Cuba suggested the
inclusion of social and political groups as protected in Article 6 of the
Statute. The delegation from Ireland responded to this proposal, pointing
out that while the delegates could improve upon the definition if they were
drafting a new Genocide Convention, as that was not the case, the U.N.
General Assembly should not examine the content of the crime. 6'
In this section, I will examine the discussion about the concept of
political genocide and some of the arguments supporting the idea of
treating the extermination of political groups as a crime of genocide, in
order to show how their claims are based in an ontological conception of
the crime of genocide. In the first judicial interpretation of the Genocide
'Convention of 1948, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) wrote that only stable groups should be protected by the Genocide
Convention. Although in the indictment of the Nuremberg trials the crime
60. Lippman, supra note 11, at 608.
61. COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OBSERVER'S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 110 (Nomos, Baden.Baden, Triffterer, Otto ed., 1999).

However in some other matters the U.N. General Assembly did modify the content of some crimes,
as it was the case of the crime of enforced pregnancy, taking into account the comments made by
the Holy See. See ROY S. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OFTHE ROME
STATUTE 365-69 (1999).
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of genocide is mentioned, the judgment sentenced the defendants for the
commission of crimes against humanity:6"
511. On reading through the travauxpriparatoiresof the Genocide
Convention, it appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly
perceived as targeting only "stable" groups, constituted in a
permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by
birth, with the exclusion of the more "mobile" groups which one
joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as political
and economic groups. Therefore, a common criterion in the four
types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that
membership in such groups would seem to be normally not
challengeable by its members, who belong to it automatically, by
birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner....
516. Moreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups
protected by the Genocide Convention, echoed in Article 2 of the
Statute, should be limited to only the four groups expressly
mentioned and whether they should not also include any group
which is stable and permanent like the said four groups. In other
words, the question that arises is whether it would be impossible to
punish the physical destruction of a group as such under the
Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and
membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of any one of
the four groups expressly protected by the Genocide Convention.
In the opinion of the Chamber, it is particularly important to respect
the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which
according to the travaux priparatoires,was patently to ensure the
63
protection of any stable and permanent group.
This official interpretation appears to avoid any discussion on the topic
of political genocide because neither the Genocide Convention nor its
judicial interpretation can be used as sources to support any reference to
political genocide. However, to authors like Bassiouni, the Genocide
Convention has some flaws derived from the exclusion of political
groups.64 He advocates the inclusion of political groups within the
Genocide Convention, because since 1948 "there have been several mass
62. Cf HOWARD FERTIG, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1992).

63. Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu (Sept. 2, 1998) (citations
omitted).
64. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 67.
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killings that could be called genocide. Nevertheless the political response65
to those events has not been addressed by the international community.
Even though he advocates for the inclusion, he seems to acknowledge that
neither the Resolution nor the Genocide Convention are a basis for the
inclusion of political groups, since he provides pragmatic arguments for
the protection of political groups. In so doing, he seems to regard current
international law as insufficient to provide for the protection of those
groups. However, he does not give any further reason to support his
comments.
Since the drafting of the Genocide Convention, the exclusion of
political groups has been criticized because it left political groups without
any protection under international law, due to the belief that crimes against
humanity had to be committed in times of war in order to be punished.
After 1948, several scholars proposed the inclusion of political groups
within the scope of the Genocide Convention and others maintained that
those groups were already protected under international law. Chalk and
Jonassohn, for instance, wrote that with the deletion of political groups, the
Genocide Convention does not cover any of the killings that have occurred
since 1948 and "potential perpetrators have taken care to victimize only
those groups that are not covered by the convention's definition."66 This
theory does not take into account that the mass killing of the members of
a political group is still a crime under international law, namely, a crime
against humanity. Therefore, it is hard under current international law to
claim that the perpetrator of such a crime can be considered nonpunishable for the crimes committed.
Critics of excluding political groups argue that
one consequence of this exclusion is the difficulty in determining
whether victims are part of one of the protected groups in those
cases where political divisions tend to fall along ethnic, racial or
religious lines ... a protected group does not lose its protected
status under the Convention because it happens to include or even
consist entirely of political opponents.67
They argue that the definition reflects the cold war and the post-holocaust
times. According to them, "the limitation of that definition - particularly
the restricted list of protected groups and the intent requirement - impose
significant obstacles to making out a case of genocide in many situations.
65. Id.
66. SCHABAS, supra note 11, at 102 (quoting Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn).
67. Id. at 35.
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In many cases, it may be difficult to determine whether victims constitute
a cohesive group that the Convention protects. 68
In their analysis of the issue, Ratner and Abrams confound the element
of intention with that of motives to commit the crime. 69 It is clear under the
Genocide Convention that the key element to determine when an attack
against a group is genocide is the intention of the agent. If the agent does
not have the intention of eliminating the protected group in whole or in
part, it is clear that the act is not a crime of genocide. But if the intention
is to eliminate the protected group as such, then no matter what the reasons
were, the attack is still a crime of genocide.
But no matter the clarity of the definition of genocide, scholars like
Kurt Jonassohn hold that the definition of the 1948 Genocide Convention
is unsatisfactory for "none of the major victims groups of those genocides
that have occurred since its adoption fall within its respective
specifications." 7 ° The exclusion of some groups, like political groups,
made it impossible for them to qualify as victims of genocide because they
were omitted from the definition. According to him, the failure to amend
the Genocide Convention is surprising, mostly taking into account that the
1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee
Convention) specifies that a refugee is "[a]ny person who owing to well
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality."7 The interpretation of Jonassohn is that these
two conflicting definitions, the one included in the Genocide Convention
and the other one included in the 1951 Refugee Convention, "arising from
the same organization, seem to produce the paradox that some people
fleeing from a genocide are being recognized as refugees, while those
unable to flee from the same genocide are not acknowledged as being its
victims. '' 72 This analysis fails to take into account that the persecution of
a group can be considered either genocide, if it has all the elements of the
Genocide Convention, or a crime against humanity, provided it is part of
a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. In the case
of the elimination of political groups, it is clear that it has to be considered

68. Id. at 42.
69. See generally STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S.ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTs ATROCITIES ININTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (2001).

70. JONASSOHN & BJORSON, supra note 10, at 9. Jonassohn & Bjorson do not take into
account the cases of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The article discussing the crime of genocide was
written in 1989 and it was published in the book without further revision.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 9-10.
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a crime against humanity, since political groups are not under the scope of
the Genocide Convention.
But Jonassohn misinterprets the 1951 Refugee Convention. According
to the Refugee Convention, a person who is persecuted for political
motives has the status of refugee. The perpetrator of the crime could be
punished for the commission of a crime of genocide - if it is an attack
against a national, racial, ethnic, or religious group with the intention of
eliminating the group - or a crime against humanity, where the motives
of the perpetrator are irrelevant to determine whether the act should be
tried as a genocide or a crime against humanity. The 1951 Refugee
Convention does not determine the status of the author of the crime but
only the conditions under which a person could be considered a refugee.
In sum, Jonassohn mistakenly takes the 1951 Refugee Convention as
support for his claim that after 1951 the United Nations considered
political genocide a crime under international law, and in seeing a
contradiction between this and the 1948 Genocide Convention. In his
sociological definition made for the purposes of his analysis, Jonassohn
confounded the crime of genocide with a crime against humanity and put
aside the other acts prohibited under the 1948 Genocide Convention.
His proposed definition is: "Genocide is a form of one-sided mass
killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that
group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator. ,7 With such
a definition, Jonassohn not only leaves aside all the legal development of
the concept of genocide, but also it trivializes it by broadening its
application. The definition seems to give ontological value to the concept
of genocide, and in so doing it ends up treating all groups as victims of the
crime of genocide, making the distinction between genocide and crimes
against humanity impossible.
The ontological conception of genocide is based on the Advisory
Opinion on the Reservations of the Genocide Convention rendered by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on May 28th, 1951. Those scholars
who call on the authority of Resolution 96(1) and the interpretation of the
ICJ in this opinion do not take into account that this decision only provides
a conclusion; namely, that the principles recognized in the 1948 Genocide
Convention are binding for all the states, regardless of conventional
obligation. The language of the advisory opinion does not allow an
interpretation of political groups as protected under the label of genocide

73. Other scholars, like Barbara Harff propose the creation of the crime of "politicide," on
the basis that without its creation the act will be unpunished. Harff, supra note 10, at 29.
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by international law.74 Moreover, the decision of the ICJ aims only at
determining whether it is possible to have reservations on the Genocide
Convention or if it is binding even for states that were not parties to the
Convention." According to Drost, the 1946 Resolution 96(1) does not
include political groups and only refers to the motives or grounds whereby
a crime of genocide can be committed.76 Despite this interpretation, he
deems the deletion of political groups as regrettable because those groups
have often been the victims of "acts of genocide. 77
The ontological conception is based in the misunderstanding of the
history of the Genocide Convention and the nature of crimes against
humanity. We have seen that the history of Resolution 96(I) and the
Genocide Convention shows that political groups were explicitly excluded

74. In the San Francisco Conference in 1945 those proposals aiming at granting legislative
power to the U.N. General Assembly were rejected. Instead, the U.N. Charter states that the U.N.
General Assembly resolutions "on matters other than internal U.N. operations are recommendations
to the members." M.J. PETERSON, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN WORLD POLITICS 138 (1986).
75. The text of the opinion examines
What kind of reservations may be made and what kind of objections may be taken
to them. The solution must be found in the special characteristics of the Genocide
Convention.... [Tihe principles underlying the Convention are recognized by
civilized nations as binding on States even without any conventional
obligation. . . . The Genocide Convention was therefore intended . . . to be
definitely universal in scope. . . . [It] was manifestly adopted for a purely
humanitarian and civilizing purpose... [T]he contracting States do not have any
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest... The
object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of
the General Assembly and of the States which adopted it that as many States as
possible should participate .... It is inconceivable that the contracting parties
readily contemplated that an objection to a minor reservation should produce
(complete exclusion from the Convention.] But even less could the contracting
parties have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in favour of
a vain desire to secure as many participants as possible.... It follows that it is the
compatibility of a reservation with the object and the purpose of the Convention
that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the
reservation . ..as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the
reservation ....[Consequently,] Question I, on account of its abstract character,
cannot be given an absolute answer. The appraisal of a reservation and the effect
of objections depend upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951
I.C.J. 23-24, 26 (May 28).
76. The fact is that Resolution 96(I) did include political groups as an example of genocides
in the history of humanity. However the binding value of that Resolution is limited.
77. 2 PIETER DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 60 (1959).
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from the scope of the Genocide Convention. In the following section we
will see why some perceived a need to have an ontological conception of
genocide.
IV.CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

According to Dixon,78 the definition of crimes against humanity has
evolved since it was first mentioned in the Declaration of St. Petersburg
in 1868. The purpose of the Declaration was limitation of the use of
weapons "contrary to the laws of humanity,"7 9 showing an interest for
bringing the law and limitations to warfare, an activity traditionally
defined as lawless.80 At the First Conference of Peace in The Hague in
1899, the word "humanity" was mentioned again with the approval of the
so-called Martens Clause in the preamble of the Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land."1 The clause established that
civilian population and belligerents are under the protection of the
principles of international law, the laws of humanity, and the requirements
of public consciousness. In the Declaration of the European governments,
in May 24th, 1915, that investigated the atrocities committed in World

78. See Rodney Dixon, Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity,in COMMENTARY

ONTHE ROME
note 61.
79. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grams Weight, Nov. 29th (Dec. 11 th) 1868, 18 Marteus Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474.
80. This is implicit in the expression written by Von Clausewitz according to which "war is
a mere continuation of policy by other means." Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEW1TZ, 1 ON WAR 23 (J.J.
Grahamm trans. Barnes & Noble 1966).
81. The clause named after Russian diplomat Fiodor Martens is as follows:
STATUTE, supra

Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the
usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the
dictates of the public conscience.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1
Bevans 31.
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War I, the governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia considered
the Armenian case a crime against humanity. 2 Even so, there was no
definition of the acts amounting to crimes against humanity.83
Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (Nuremberg Charter) provided the first definition of crimes
against humanity in the following terms:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
This definition created several problems regarding the jurisdiction of
the Nuremberg Tribunal. 5 Due to the so-called "incident of the Comma,"
there was no certainty about the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal
regarding crimes against humanity. According to the American and French
translation of the Nuremberg Charter, only the crime of persecution had

82. Nowadays the Armenian atrocities are considered a case of genocide rather than a crime
against humanity. See, e.g., Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and
InternationalLaw: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications,
14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221 (1989). Dadrian considers this case as a crime of genocide. He pointed out
that between 1894 to 1896 and 1909, 200,000 Armenians were killed and in all over one million
were put to death. Id at 223. Only in 1985 the United Nations took note of the genocide committed.
Id. at 224. In 1987, the European Union labeled the crime as a crime of genocide under the
Genocide Convention of 1948 and required that Turkey acknowledge the genocide before the
European Parliament would consider Turkey's application for membership. Id.
83. Since there was no previous definition of crimes against humanity, the Nuremberg Trial
might be considered a violation of the rule of law, especially of the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege, nullapoena sine lege praevin. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 153. However, several scholars
considered that in this case justice overweighed the rule of law and therefore the trial was
legitimate. The first definition in the modem criminal law of the civil law tradition of the principle
"nulla crime" is found in Feuerbach. Bassiouni holds that the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials violate
the rule of law. Id. at 158-67; see also RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL (1971); GIL, supra note 17.
84. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals ofthe European
Axis Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 1556, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 288; see also BASSlOUNI, supra note 10, at 521-88; Marie-Claude Roberge,
Jurisdicci6nde los Tribunales ad hoc para ex Yugoslavia y Ruanda por lo que respecta a los
crimenes de lesa humanidady de genocidio, En REVISTA DE LA CRUz ROJA 144 (1997).
85. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 10 (regarding the following discussion); GIL, supra note 17
(about this history and the discussion with respect of whether before the crime of persecution it was
a comma or a semicolon).
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to be connected to another crime under the jurisdiction of the Nuremburg
Tribunal, because there was a semicolon before the text "or persecution"
in Article 6. According to the Russian translation, there was a comma
before "or persecution," and therefore all the crimes against humanity had
to be linked to a crime under the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Once the delegates analyzed the translation and the records, they found
that the Russian translation was the correct one.
The wording of Article 6 meant that the main problem facing the
Nuremberg Tribunal was that the crimes against humanity had to be
connected to one of the crimes within thejurisdiction of the Tribunal. That
means that to consider an act a crime against humanity, this particular act
had to be committed in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal. This meant that crimes
committed before 1939, that is, before the beginning of World War lI,
went unpunished.
The notion that crimes against humanity occur only during wars - the
Nuremberg doctrine - was considered the mainstream doctrine for more
than forty years, despite the fact that the Principles of Nuremberg and Law
No. 10 of the Council of Control defined these crimes regardless of its
connection to the armed conflict. According to the definition of the
Nuremberg Tribunal's jurisdiction, it did not investigate any major
criminal for crimes committed before 1939, but the military tribunals in
the occupied zones could try minor criminals of war for crimes committed
before 1939. The International Law Commission (ILC) did not follow the
definition made by the Nuremberg Charter and in 1954 defined crimes
against humanity as crimes that could be committed in times of war or in
times of peace. In Article 2 of the Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, the ILC defined all the crimes under the
jurisdiction of the international tribunal they wanted to create. Crimes
against humanity are defined in the following terms:
The following acts are offences against the peace and security of
mankind...
(11) Inhumane acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement[,]
deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian
population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds
by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the
instigation or with toleration of such authorities.8 6
86. 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 9, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), available at http://www.un.orglaw/ilc/texts
offfra.htm (last visited May 24, 2003).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

23

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 4

[Vol. 15

In Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, the crime of persecution
involves an attack on political, racial, or religious grounds, whereas in the
ILC definition persecution on social or cultural grounds was qualified as
a crime against humanity. The draft presents these crimes in a similar
fashion to the crime of genocide, but the latter is defined as a crime
committed with the intention of eliminating the group as such. However,
in the definition of Article 2-11, the crime has to be committed on
political, social, racial, religious, or cultural grounds - that is to say, the
reason for committing the crime is the characteristic of the group, but the
agent does not intend to eliminate the group as such. This distinction is
important because some crimes against humanity can be distinguished
from genocide only by taking into account the element of intent, i.e. the
crime of extermination.
The Nuremberg doctrine was discussed in some of the decisions taken
by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Dusko Tadic.87 In the discussion of
the motion on the issue of jurisdiction, the Tadic defense counsel raised
the issue of jurisdiction by claiming that
the Tribunal only has jurisdiction under Article 5 of the Statute if
it involves crimes that have been committed in the execution of or
in connection with an international armed conflict. [] It purports to
find authority for this proposition requiring the existence of an
armed conflict of an international nature in the Nuremberg Charter
which, in its definition of crimes against humanity, spoke of
inhumane acts committed "in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. . ." and in the
affirmation given to the principles of international law recognized
by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and Judgment of the
Tribunal in General Assembly resolution 95(1) of 1948. The
Defence further contends that the broadening of the scope of Article
5 to crimes when committed in armed conflicts of an internal
character offends the nullum crimen principle.88

87. According to former prosecutor of the ICTY, Richard Goldstone, the ICTY was created
due to the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing, the existence of concentration camps and the
provision existing in the Genocide Convention. RICHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY:
REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIME INVESTIGATOR 78-79 (2000).
88. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-T, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdication (Trial Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Aug. 10, 1995), 77 availableat
http://www.un.orglicty/tadicltrialc2/decision-e/100895.htm (last visited May 23,2003) (emphasis

omitted).
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The Trial Chamber in the decision of this motion disagreed with the
opinion of the defense counsel, and showed that international law allowed
for a broader interpretation of the concept of crimes against humanity. The
Trial Chamber found that the language used in the ICTY Statute does not
allow an interpretation aiming at linking crimes against humanity to an
armed conflict. But since the Statute required this link for this particular
conflict, the jurisdiction of the ICTY certainly linked those crimes with the
conflict. The Trial Chamber wrote in this decision responding to the claim
of the defense counsel:
The Trial Chamber does not agree. The nexus in the Nuremberg
Charter between crimes against humanity and the other two
categories, crimes against peace and war crimes, was peculiar to the
context of the Nuremberg Tribunal established specifically "for the
just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of
the European Axis countries." (Nuremberg Charter, Article 1)....
In conclusion, the Trial Chamber emphasizes that the definition
of Article 5 is in fact more restrictive than the general definition of
crimes against humanity recognized by customary international law.
The inclusion of the nexus with armed conflict in the article
imposes a limitation on thejurisdiction of the International Tribunal
and certainly can in no way offend the nullum crimen principle so
as to bar the International Tribunal from trying the crimes
enumerated therein. Because the language of Article 5 is clear, the
crimes against humanity to be tried in the International Tribunal
must have a nexus with an armed conflict, be it international or
internal. 9
The doctrine rendered in Tadic can be seen as a change in the
conception of crimes against humanity. Even though in this decision the
ICTY states that those crimes against humanity under the jurisdiction of
the tribunal have to be committed in connection with the Yugoslavian
conflict, this is so because of the jurisdiction rationae temporis of the
tribunal. But it also implies that this is a limitation of the ICTY Statute and
it cannot be considered a feature of the concept of crimes against
humanity, as it was the case in the Nuremberg doctrine, because under
customary international law crimes against humanity can be punished
whether they have committed in times of peace or in times of war.

89. Id.

78, 83.
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The Appeals Chamber affirmed the decision of the Trial Chamber on
October 2nd, 1995. In this decision the Appeals Chamber wrote:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes
against humanity do not require a connection to international armed
conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary
international law may not require a connection between crimes
against humanity and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that
crimes against humanity be committed in either internal or
international armed conflict, the Security Council may have defined
the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than necessary under
customary international law. There is no question, however, that the
definition of crimes against humanity adopted by the Security
Council in Article 5 comports with the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege.9 °
Regarding this point, Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, in their
analysis of the ICTY Statute, pointed out that the statute is not pretending
to change the doctrine regarding the link to an armed conflict, but it is just
establishing a temporal limitation, to be applied only in the conflict of the
former Yugoslavia.91 According to these scholars, the concept of crime
against humanity does not require any link to an armed conflict and Article
5 of the ICTY Statute does not modify this customary law.9 2
In the judgment rendered on May 7th, 1997, the Trial Chamber of the
ICTY analyzed the conduct of Dusko Tadic in the conflict of Yugoslavia.
Since Tadic was charged with the commission of crimes against humanity,
the Trial Chamber analyzed this category in order to summarize the state
of the doctrine in international criminal law. The Trial Chamber wrote that
the category was applied in the Nuremberg Tribunal with the intention to
punish those who did not commit war crimes in a traditional sense but "to
include those who committed other serious crimes that fall outside the
ambit of traditional war crimes, such as crimes where the victim is

90. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case IT-94-l-T, Decision on the Defence Mtion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber, Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Oct. 2,
1995), 141, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (last visited
May 23, 2003).
91. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 39, at 82-84.
92. Id.
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stateless, has the same nationality as the perpetrator, or that of a state allied
with that of the perpetrator." 93
The Trial Chamber analyzed in detail the requirements to constitute a
crime against humanity94 and affirmed the doctrines held in its previous
decisions, particularly the one of August 10th, 1995, mentioned earlier. It
was clear for the ICTY that crimes against humanity do not have to be
linked to an armed conflict and that this is the current mainstream doctrine.
This doctrine was affirmed in the decision of the Appeals Chamber on July
15th, 1999. The Appeals Chamber accepted the interpretation of the
Prosecution regarding the link to an armed conflict in the following terms:
The Appeals Chamber would also agree with the Prosecution that
the words "committed in armed conflict" in Article 5 of the Statute
require nothing more than the existence of an armed conflict at the
relevant time and place. The Prosecution is, moreover, correct in
asserting that the armed conflict requirement is a jurisdictional
element, not "a substantive element of the mens rea of crimes
against humanity" (i.e. not a legal ingredient of the subjective
element of the crime).95
Summarizing, in Tadic, the ICTY considered whether crimes against
humanity must be linked to an armed conflict in order for the person to be
accountable for the commission of those acts. The Appeals Chamber,
found that customary international law did not suggest such an
interpretation; that the limits imposed by the ICTY Statute were only a
matter of jurisdiction and not a matter of the substantive definition of the
crimes against humanity. After the decision of the Appeals Chamber it was
clear that those crimes could be committed in times of peace or in times
of war, and that they did not need a nexus with an armed conflict. 96

93. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94- 1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Trial Chamber,
Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., May 7, 1997), 619, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/tadic
trialc2/judgement/index.htm (last visited May 23, 2003) (hereinafter Tadic I).
94. Whether this conflict has to be international or not international- that is under the scope
of common Article 3 to Geneva Conventions of 1949 - was discussed by the International
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Akayesu. Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgement (Chamber I, Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Sept. 2,1998) § 1.3, availableat http://www.ictr.
org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay0O0l.htm (last visited May 23, 2003).
95. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, (Appeals Chamber, Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., July 15, 1999), 1249, availableat www.un.org/icty/ (last visited Mar.
4, 2003).
96. See id. 1251.
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This doctrine was repeated in the decisions of the ICTR, but Akayesu
also showed that a crime against humanity could be committed in a noninternational conflict.97 The question arose again during the drafting of the
Rome Statute. In Article 7 of the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity
are defined as a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population. The drafters of the Rome Statute discussed the relation of the
act to an armed conflict, and clearly rejected the revival of the Nuremberg
doctrine, because if crimes against humanity were connected to armed
conflict, there would not be any distinction between them and crimes of
war; that is to say, the category would be useless.98 The Preparatory
Commission, in charge of the drafting of the elements of crime, took into
account the Tadic doctrine and followed almost literally the ICTY Statute
on this topic. 99
Before the Tadic doctrine, it was clear why some scholars were
advocating the inclusion of political groups within the scope of the
Genocide Convention. Once the Nuremberg doctrine was officially
modified, it became necessary to justify the reasons to include a political
group in the Genocide Convention, since both crimes (genocide and
crimes against humanity) are crimes under international law and can be
committed in times of peace or in times of war.
In the following section, we will see that because petitioners in the
Diaz case before the ICHR used the Nuremberg doctrine, they had to adopt
an ontological conception of genocide. Under such a conception, since the
elimination of the membership of the UP occurred in times of peace, it
seemed to impose the conclusion that the only way to secure punishment
for the perpetrators of that crime was by labeling it as a political genocide.
V. THE ELIMINATION OF THE UP AS ACRIME OF GENOCIDE
As mentioned earlier, the UP party was the result of the peace
negotiations between Colombian government and the guerrilla
organization FARC. According to the ICHR, "the State further confirmed
that it would ensure that the leadership of the FARC would be allowed to
97. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, '1565. The Court wrote: "Crimes against
humanity are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character." Id.
98. RoY LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OFTHE ROME STATUTE
91-93 (1999).
99. See Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2
(2000).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/4

28

Benavides-Vanegas:
The Elimination
of Political
GroupsLAWAND
Under International
Law603
and
2003]
THE ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL
GROUPS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL
THE CONSTITUTION

t

participate in political activities."1 0 The purpose of the UP party was to
ensure FARC a political vehicle to make possible assimilation into civilian
life. 01 According to the petitioners, the acts committed against the
members of the UP constitute genocide and the violation of the human
rights protected in the ICHR.'0 2
The petitioners in Diaz based their claim on the assumption that the
crimes committed against this political group would go unpunished under
the category ofcrimes against humanity, because the crime* was not
committed in connection with a crime of war or a crime of aggression or
in the context of an internal armed conflict. Since they held the ontological
conception of genocide and saw the need of punishment against the
perpetrators of this crime, they used the category of genocide to obtain the
punishment of those crimes committed in times of peace. In this case, the
ontological conception and the Nuremberg doctrine contributed to make
the claim under the nonexistent category of political genocide.
In analyzing the claims made by the petitioners, the ICHR observed
that they had not alleged facts that
would tend to show that the Patriotic Union is a "national, ethnical,
racial or religious group." Instead, the petitioners have alleged that
the members of the Patriotic Union have been persecuted solely
because of their membership in a political group. Although political
affiliation may be intertwined with national, ethnic or racial identity
under certain circumstances, the petitioners have not alleged that
such a situation exists in relation to the membership of the Patriotic
Union.' ° 3
Given that the charges were made on the basis that the deeds against
the members of the UP were acts of persecution against a political group
with the purpose of eliminating it as such and the fact that the Genocide
Convention does not include political groups amongst the protected groups
of the Convention, the ICHR concluded that the case does not fall within
100. Diaz et al. v. Colombia, Case 11.227, Inter.-Am. C.H.R. 5/97, OEA/ser.L.V./II.95 doc.
7 rev. 99 (1997), 2, availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1996/colombia5-97.htm
(last visited June 18, 2003). The ICHR made different visits in situ to Colombia in which it had the
opportunity to receive information from the government and human rights NGOs regarding the
situation of human rights in Colombia and particularly in the UP. The ICHR also relied on the
report of human rights presented by the then Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman) Jaime C6rdoba
Trivifio. Id.
101. Id. 3.
102. Id. 4.
103. Id. 23.
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the current definition of genocide provided by international law. The
ICHR, however, found that there were several acts of persecution, mass
killing, and forced disappearance against the members of the UP. Based
on the evidence, the ICHR found that there was "a pattern and practice of
persecution of the membership of the Patriotic Union with the involvement
or at least with the tolerance of the Colombian State."' ' Given the weight
of the evidence, the ICHR found that the Colombian state violated several
provisions of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention and,
therefore, declared the case before them admissible for further
proceedings.
Meanwhile, some members of Colombian NGOs exerted pressure to
obtain a bill establishing political genocide as a crime in Colombia. As the
result of that pressure and after more than five years of negotiations, the
Colombian Congress passed the Forced Disappearance Act (Ley 589 de
2000 "por medio de la cual se tipifica el genocidio, la desaparici6n
forzada, el despIzamiento forzado y la tortura y se dictan otras
disposiciones").05 This Act is the result of a long process in which several
NGOs and members of the government were involved in order to obtain
the punishment of the crime of forced disappearance. However, in the
process some delegates in the special commission created to draft the bill
suggested the inclusion of other crimes like torture, genocide and forced
displacement. During the negotiation of the bill in the Colombian
Congress, some representatives asked the inclusion of these crimes, with
the same definition, in the bill of penal code that was being discussed in
the Colombian Congress.
Proposals to include political groups in the definition of the crime of
genocide elicited criticism from members of the military forces who
argued that the definition would impede the anti-subversive activities
carried on by the military forces and, therefore, they would be unable to
fulfill their constitutional duties. Even though the argument in favor was
weak under Colombian Law, the Colombian Congress passed a definition
of the crime covering political groups provided they develop legitimate
activities. In other words, since FARC has been recognized as political
actors only for the purposes of the peace process, an act of extermination
of a group with the intention of eliminating members of FARC would not

104. Id. 138.
105. The text of the act was included in the new Penal Code (Ley 599 de 2000). See C6D. PEN.
(Ley 599 de 2000) (Co.), availableat http://bib.minjusticia.gov.co/normas/leyes/2000/L5992000.
htm (last visited May 23, 2003).
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be deemed genocide under Colombian Penal Law." Supporters of the
inclusion of political groups in the definition of the crime of genocide 7
argued that organizations like the UP 0 8 and the Communist Party could
also be victims of genocide, without any punishment whatsoever, because
they were not considered political parties under the law and, therefore,
they were groups acting outside the law."°
The Colombian Constitutional Court exerted judicial review on the Act,
in response to the petition filed to eliminate the words "acting legally."
The Colombian Constitutional Court found that the exclusion of political
groups in the Genocide Convention does not prevent nation-states from
including those groups in its own definition of the crime of genocide,
provided the definition retains the core of the Genocide Convention, that
is, the systematic and deliberate destruction of a human group with a
definite identity."' According to the Colombian Constitutional
Court,
1
identity.I
of
sort
that
has
group
political
a
that
doubt
there is no
With respect to the scope of the legal definition, the Colombian
Constitutional Court found that it violated the Colombian Constitution, for
it made a distinction amongst political groups not allowed in the
Colombian Constitution. The Colombian Constitutional Court concluded
that "the liberty of human dignity and the right to life and personal

106. The wording of the article is the result of the pressure exerted by the Military Forces.
According to the law, those organizations involved in a peace process with the government are
recognized as political organizations. Since the process is being held without any truce, antisubversive activities would not be considered an attack against a political group and therefore an
act of genocide.
107. Comisi6n Colombiana de Juristas, Colectivo de Abogados Josd Alvear Restrepo,
ASFADDES, and other human rights NGOs.
108. Due to the principle nulla crimen sine lege, the acts committed against the UP before
June 2001, where the penal code came into force, have to be punished as homicide.
109. The Political Parties Act recognized the status of political parties to those organizations
that obtained a certain number of votes in the past election and had a certain number of
representatives in the Colombian Congress.
110. The Political Parties Act will be applied to those crimes committed in Colombia.
However, Colombian Penal Law recognizes the principle of universal jurisdiction. See COD. PEN.
art. 16 (Co.). That means that in theory the Colombian definition of genocide would be applied to
a foreigner who committed a crime against a political group outside Colombia and is within the
Colombian territory. It is clear the contradiction that would be between the Colombian law and
international law. Since international law has more weight than national law, the Genocide
Convention is part of the Colombian Constitution. It is clear that in a case like that a Colombian
court would have to apply the Genocide Convention and not the penal code.
111. Sentencia No. C-177 de 2001, Corte Constitucional de ia Republica de Colombia, Feb.
14, 2001, available at http://bib.minjusticia.gov.co/jurisprudencia/CorteConstitucional/2001/
Constitucionalidad/C-177-01 .htm (last visited May 23,2001) (Justice Fabio Mor6n Dfaz wrote the
opinion of the Colombian Court).
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integrity does not admit differentiations based on the legality of the
activity displayed by the subjects protected in the law.""..2 Both the petition
before the ICHR and the creation of the crime of genocide in Colombia are
the result of the same misunderstanding of international law. The
definition in Colombian criminal law is the result of the pressure exerted
by Colombian NGOs in the Colombian Congress. Their interpretation of
international law indicated that the only way to punish acts like the one
committed against the UP was by creating a new crime and including
political groups within the scope of the definition of genocide.
According to Drost, national and political groups are closely related
and a national group will most likely come within the term of the
Genocide Convention because of its political nature." 3 Judge Baltazar
Garzon in Argentinean and Pinochet took the same position.'1 4 In those
cases, the political group was protected under the label of a national and
even a religious group. In the next section, we will see how Garz6n
analyzed and misunderstood the 1948 Genocide Convention in order to
keep jurisdiction on both cases.
VI. THE ELIMINATION OF POLITICAL GROUPS IN ARGENTINEAN
AND PINOCHET

On September 1lth, 1973, Chilean president Salvador Allende was
killed and the first socialist government in Latin America elected by
democratic means was replaced by an authoritarian dictatorship ruled by
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. In the days following the establishment
of the dictatorship, Pinochet and his secret service, the DINA, began the
Caravanade la Muerte, 5 as a result of which more than one hundred
people were killed or forcibly disappeared.
The Chilean dictatorship was not alone in its attempt to establish a new
form of government in its country. Other dictators of Latin America,
particularly of the South Cone, were interested in sharing information
about political dissidents in order to take the proper measures to stop

112. Id. The translation is that of the author.
113. DROST, supra note 77, at 61.
114. See Equipo Nizkor web site, availableat http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio
(last visited May 23, 2003) (presenting the collected documents pertaining to these cases).
115. The investigation for these crimes is under the jurisdiction of Judge Guzm~n, who had
ordered the arrest of Pinochet but the Chilean Supreme Court, with Judges appointed by Pinochet,
overturned his decision. See Chilean Court Overturns Pinochet Indictment,CNN.CoM, Dec. 20,
2000, available at http://www.cnn.comi20O0WORLD/ameficas/12/20/chile.pinochet.02 (last
visited May 23, 2003).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/4

32

Benavides-Vanegas:
The
Elimination
ofUNDE)R
Political
Groups Under
International
Law and
2003] THE ELIMINATION OF
POLITICAL
GROUPS
INTERNATIONAL
LA WAND
THE CONSTITUTION
607 t

political opposition in their countries. In doing so, these countries began
Operation Condor, an operation aimed at eliminating political dissidents
wherever they were hidden. Investigations directed by human rights NGOs
demonstrated that Chileans seeking refuge in Uruguay or Argentina were
kidnapped and sent to Chile, wherein they forcibly disappeared. 116
Margarita Lacabe describes Operation Condor in the following way:
Operation Condor was organized by the head of the Chilean
National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) as a way to collect and
exchange intelligence information related to leftist, communist and
Marxist activists, so as to facilitate the "elimination of
communism" and defend the "Western-Christian" society. In the
framework of Operation Condor, mutual-aid agreements were
accorded by the Intelligence Services of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Paraguay and Uruguay - with the added participation of Brazil and
Peru. The agreements facilitated the free acting of intelligence
services throughout the region, and the execution of common
repressive operations. The agreement also allowed for the
deployment of special task forces to countries party to the
agreement that would eliminate opposition politicians, subversives
and suspected subversives.
Dozens of Chileans, Uruguayans, Paraguayans, Brazilians and
Bolivians who had sought refuge in Argentina were captured by
their own Intelligence Forces in Argentina; others were directly
killed. In addition, Chilean political activists were arrested by the
Argentinian police and handed to the DINA; many of these
disappeared. "'
On October 16th, 1996, about eight years after the transition to a new
government in Chile, several human rights activists denounced Pinochet
before the Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n No. 5 in Madrid, in order to
bring him to Spain and try him for the crimes he committed while dictator
of Chile. Other activists presented a claim before Spanish justice in order
to get the trial of Argentinean Military Junta, since the process of

116. Stella Calloni, Los Archivos del Horror de la Operaci6n C6ndor, available at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/doclcondorlcalloni.html (last visited May 23,2003) (The original
in English was published by Covert Action in Fall 1994.).
117. Margarita Lacabe, The CriminalProceduresAgainstChileanandArgentinianRepressors
in Spain (1998), availableat http://www.derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html (last visited May
23, 2003).
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transition in that country ended in a general amnesty for all the people
involved, thanks to the Ley de ObedienciaDebida (Superior Orders Act)
and the Ley de Punto Final(Final Stage Act).
The claim presented in both cases included the crime of genocide, since
both dictatorships eliminated political groups. According to Paz Rojas, the
charge of genocide was supported in the most recent interpretation of the
Special Rapporteur to the implementation of the Genocide Convention in
1985. In his report the Special Rapporteur admitted genocide as the
wanton and systematic destruction, deliberate and planned, of a
meaningful part of the own national group - for instance, the elimination
of their leaders." 8 According to Paz Rojas, the systematic, planned, and
deliberate destruction of the democratic leadership of about 50% of the
Chilean nation - taking into account the results of the 1971 and 1973
elections in which the Unidad Popular,the political party of Allende,
obtained 50% and 44.3% of the votes respectively - amount to a
genocide against a national group, namely, the Chilean nation." 9
In deciding the claim presented by the victims of the Chilean
dictatorship, Judge Garz6n held that the dictatorship attacked the
Mapuches (an Indian community) and some members of the Jewish
population,' 20 which amounted to genocide against an ethnic and a racial
group. Nevertheless, Garz6n acknowledged that repression was not
directed against those people as a group but it did have a special influence
in the treatment they received by the authorities, mainly the cruelty of the
torture they received. In the decision, Garz6n held that the idea of a
national group did not exclude the idea of genocide of groups with a
common origin but differentiated within the same nation. Garz6n wrote
that he would understand the group of inhabitants living in the same
territory and under the same government as forming a "nation."
The concept of genocide, according to him, does not exclude the
concept of an autogenocide, like that one committed in Kampuchea, which
many scholars agreed to label as an act of genocide. Moreover, he argued
that the 1948 Genocide Convention does not exclude the destruction of
protected groups for political reasons.

118. PAZ ROJAS ET AL., TARDA PERO LLEGA. PINOCHET ANTE LA JUSTICIA ESPAIqOLA 51-52
(1998); see also FERNANDO MAS, DE NUREMBERG A MADRID: HISTORIA INTIMA DE UN JUICIO

(1999) (about the whole history of the process from a view point of the organization).
119. ROJAS ETAL, supra note 118, at 51-52.
120. Fernando Mas shows that some people whose last name ended in s (as Rodrigues) were
killed because that meant that those people were converted jews, even though that conversion
happened more than 300 years ago. MAS, supra note 118, at 241. In the history of the Jews in
Europe, this can also be seen. NORMAN COHN, EN POS DEL MILENIO (1988).
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Garz6n stated:
[I]n the crime of genocide the group to be destroyed totally or
partially serve for determining the specific subjective element,
motive or intention pursued with their destruction. The genocide
conduct is not only realized with the intention of destroying a
group, but, also, because of its belonging to a nation, ethnicity, race
or religion. This idea does not exclude, obviously, from the
genocide of national groups, the destruction of groups of common
origin, but differentiated within a same nation, this understood as
a territorial ambit or the whole of the inhabitants ruled by the same
government. It is evident that there are such groups with national
identity within one nation. Generally, in these cases, the cohesion
of the group is ethnic, which would explain the restrictive Spanish
legislation prior to 1983, racial or religious, but other differentiating
marks such as territory, history or language, for example, would not
be foreign to it. To totally or partially destroy Scots, Catalans,
Basques or Corsicans for the lone fact of being it, would be,
undoubtedly, a genocide of national groups not necessarily ethnic,
independently of whether this was done because of their language,
their traditions, their territorial pretensions, or their ideology - as
what is decisive is that the destruction of the group would have
been caused, precisely, because they belonged to such a national
group made 121
cohesive around any permanent differentiating
common trait.

Lacabe goes on to say: "In the same manner, the definition of national
group that does not exclude the cases in which the victims belong to the
same group than the transgressor, that is to say, the alleged cases
of
'autogenocide,' as is the case of the mass murders in Cambodia." 122
Garz6n based his arguments in the Whitaker report, which makes clear
that eliminating only a part of the group is genocide, that is, a partial
genocide is still genocide. This interpretation accords with the text of the
Genocide Convention, but the interpretation made by Garz6n has the
purpose of demonstrating that a person can partially destroy a national
group by attacking the members of a political group. In such a case, that
would be a partial autogenocide. Garzon wrote:

121. Lacabe,supra note 117.
122. Id.
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This does not mean that the destruction of groups for political
purposes be left outside [the concept of] genocide. More precisely
what it means is that these political motives must fall on a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group for the conduct of their total or
partial destruction be able to constitute genocide.' 23
In Pinochet, according to Garz6n, Pinochet aimed at destroying the
structure of the national group by attacking those people exerting functions
of leadership or ideological initiative in the Communist party, the
Mapuches, the unions, and others. The political group was attacked on
political grounds and that was the essential impulse of the conduct. In this
case, Garz6n held, there is no doubt that the destruction of the group as a
whole by an aggressor with those motives amounts to a crime of
genocide. 2 4 The same can be said when the national group is attacked this is essentially a political concept - and that mirrors the dynamic
character of the concept of genocide. Taking into account the dynamic
nature of national groups and the political characteristic of the concept of
nation, Garz6n concludes that political parties are an inherent part of
national groups which share a common identity, and therefore demand the
same protection against extermination. This concept of genocide can be
applied to every group in which there is a real, cultural, professional,
social, and political identity.'25
In sum, given the totalitarian character of the Chilean dictatorship and
the fact that it attacked people of Chilean nationality, all the elements to
label those acts as genocide were present. In analyzing the attacks against
the Communist Party, Garz6n labeled it a religious genocide, for they were
persecuted because of their atheist conception of the world. Garz6n wrote
that in the same way that Christians were persecuted in communist
regimes for religious reasons, in Chile communists were persecuted for

123. Id.

124. Id.
125. According to Lacabe,
Garzon goes on to cite the Whitaker report (Study on the Question of the
Prevention and Repression of the Crime of Genocide, undertaken by the Special

Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission, Mr. Benjamin Whitaker) for the propositions
that the group in question need not be destroyed fully, that the victims be a
majority group in the country in question, and that they belong to the same group
as the author of the violation. Garzon then acknowledges that the destruction of

political groups as a form of genocide was left out explicitly from the Convention.
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atheist reasons. In this way, he defines religion in a negative way, that is
to say, those who do not hold a religious belief have themselves a religious
belief that needs protection and is protected by the 1948 Genocide
Convention.
The decision taken in Pinochet is based on a misinterpretation of the
Genocide Convention and a bad understanding of the concept of national
groups. First of all, Garz6n confounds the concept of intentions with the
concept of motives. Even though in Pinochet many political dissidents
were attacked because of their political beliefs, the fact is that the
dictatorship did not want to eliminate the Chilean nationality as such. The
government of Pinochet did want to eliminate political dissidents who
happened to share the same nationality, but that was because they were
trying to bring a democratic regime to their home country; that was the
reason why Pinochet regime persecuted them. If we accepted Garz6n's
arguments, we would have to accept that every crime against humanity is
genocide because all the victims share the same nationality.
The argument he made in favor of treating the attack against
communists as genocide against a religious groups missed the point,
because the identity of a religious group is determined by its worship, its
beliefs in a god, and its members. A communist group shares none of these
features, unless we accept a very broad definition of religious groups. The
confusion is worse in' Argentinean. In this case, Garz6n repeated his
arguments about the attack against a national group, the idea of the
autogenocide, and the conception of the communist party as a religious
group in a negative sense. In the decision of May 1lth, 1998, Garz6n
insisted in writing that the junta wanted to eliminate the Communist Party
because it was contrary to Christian morality. 2 6 But that interpretation
does not take into account that the reasons for the persecution of this party
were not only its atheist conception. Rather, its goal to create an egalitarian
society in Argentina spurred the persecution on. To think that the
dictatorship was fighting a sort of crusade is just accepting what it used as
a way of legitimizing its terror against the Argentinean population. The
Audiencia Nacional goes further in this misinterpretation of the 1948
Genocide Convention. In the Auto of November 4th, 1998, during the
appeal of the decision by Garzon, the Audiencia denies that the drafters of
the Genocide Convention wanted to exclude political groups from the
definition of genocide:

126. Lacabe, supra note 117.
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We know that in the 1948 [Genocide C]onvention the term
"political" or the words "or others" do not appear, when it relates
in article 2 the characteristics of the group object of the destruction
proper of genocide. But silence is not the equivalent of unfailing
exclusion. Whatever the intentions of the writers of the text were,
the Convention acquires life by virtue of the successive signatures
and ratifications of the treaty by member of the United Nations who
shared the idea of genocide as an odious scourge that they should
commit themselves to prevent[ing] and sanction[ing].127
We have already seen that it was the clear purpose of the U.N. General
Assembly to exclude political groups from that definition. Therefore, the
rationale of the Audiencia Nacional for affirming the decision by Garz6n
is wrong and it is also founded in a wrong understanding of the lawmaking
process regarding the crime of genocide. Argentinean and Pinochet show
that a misunderstanding of international law, the ontological conception
of genocide - as a crime even more evil than crimes against humanity and symbolic conceptions of the law, made Judge Garz6n label as
genocide an act that clearly was a crime against humanity. The Whitaker
report and the autogenocide in Kampuchea were used to demonstrate that
political groups could be considered victims of genocide against a national
group. The intention behind this strategy was to obtain the punishment of
crimes against humanity committed in times of peace; therefore in this
case Garz6n was applying the Nuremberg doctrine to secure the
punishment of Pinochet, and of the members of the military junta in
Argentina.
VII. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have discussed different aspects of genocide and the
so-called political genocide:
* The history of the 1948 Genocide Convention shows that political
groups were excluded from the definition of the Convention.
* The label political genocide is the result of the need to punish certain
crimes against humanity committed in times of peace and under the
interpretation of the Nuremberg doctrine.
" After the Tadic doctrine there is no need to appeal to the concept of
genocide to punish persecution against political groups with the
127. Id.
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purpose of eliminating them as such; therefore international law allows
the punishment of crimes against humanity, whether they have been
committed in times of peace or in times of war.
* The decision taken by the ICHR in Diaz accords with international law,
and the claim of petitioners were within existing doctrine regarding
crimes against humanity.
* Argentineanand Pinochetand the decisions of the Spanish judges were
the result of a clear misunderstanding of the Genocide Convention and
an interpretation that is not allowed by the wording of the Genocide
Convention or by the history of the exclusion of political groups from
the scope of the Convention.
This Article has demonstrated that there are no grounds to hold that
political genocide is a crime under international law. But it also has
demonstrated that there is no need to modify current international law, for
the category of crimes against humanity is enough to guarantee the
punishment of the perpetrators of crimes like those committed in Diaz or
in Argentinean and Pinochet.Under international criminal law, applied to
individuals, or under the international law of human rights, applied to
states, the actions of Colombia and the South Cone dictatorships can be
treated as crimes against humanity or as a human rights violation,
respectively. The label genocide does not add any further punishment or
make the act more serious. The victims of the crime would not acquire a
symbolic dimension for the fact that the act is called a crime of genocide.
All three cases are crimes under international law and can be punished
with the instruments that the law provides.
Some could argue that the requirement that the act be part of a
systematic or widespread attack to be considered a crime against humanity
imposes the need of creating a concept of political genocide. However the
experience of the tribunals and the history of genocides show that none of
them have been isolated acts and instead are part of systematic or
widespread attacks against a civilian population.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

39

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 4

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss4/4

40

